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Kicking	the	bucket	down	the	road	to	Norway:	EEA	is
back
Many	months	after	it	was	ruled	out	by	the	government,	membership	of	the	European	Economic
Area	(the	‘Norway	option’)	is	being	mooted	once	again.	Given	Theresa	May’s	procrastination	and
the	obstacle	of	the	Northern	Ireland	border,	writes	Jim	Gallagher	(Centre	on	Constitutional
Change),	it	may	be	that	–	over	time	–	what	is	effectively	continued	economic	but	not	political	union
is	broadly	acceptable	to	British	public	opinion.
“The	Prophet	of	the	utterly	absurd
Of	the	patently	impossible	and	vain”
Kipling,	The	Song	of	the	Banjo
There	is	surprisingly	little	satisfaction	in	prophesying	correctly.	Eighteen	months	ago,	I	predicted	the	course	of	Brexit
would	be	determined	by	its	genesis.	Because	there	was	no	plan,	the	UK	would	not	be	ready	to	leave	on	the	due
date,	and	would	need	a	transitional	arrangement	that	looked	just	like	the	European	Economic	Area.	So	it	has	proved.
For	the	same	reason,	Theresa	May	would	trigger	Article	50	on	an	incoherent	and	undeliverable	prospectus,	and	she
would	then	have	to	decide	between	party	unity	and	the	national	interest.	She	did,	and	we	watch	her	agonies	on	a
daily	basis.
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In	every	tragedy,	character	is	destiny,	but	predicting	the	last	act	of	this	one	from	Brexit’s	character	is	not	simple.	Still,
here	goes.
Theresa	May’s	dream
Theresa	May	has	no	objectives	for	Britain’s	future	relationship	with	Europe	on	trade,	migration,	regulation	or	the	like.
She	may	have	carefully	concealed	preferences,	but	she	has	only	two	aims.	The	first,	she	thinks,	was	given	her	from
above:	the	British	people	decided	to	leave,	and	she	is	determined	to	leave	on	the	date	she	set.	The	second	is,	if
anything,	more	important:	the	Conservative	Party	must	stay	united.	Everything	else	is	secondary	to	these	aims.
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You	might	think	this	impossible,	given	the	open	warfare	inside	the	Cabinet,	government	and	party.	Every	agonising
day,	however,	is	one	day	nearer	exit,	reducing	the	opportunity	for	second	referendum	campaigners.	Her	aim	is	to
maintain	the	maximum	ambiguity	about	our	future	relationship	with	Europe	until	we	have	left.	In	her	dream,	Europe	is
prepared	to	postpone	crystallising	any	of	the	hard	choices	until	well	into	the	transition	period	–	why	need	they	rush?
	Then	the	two	wings	of	her	party,	faced	with	the	reality	of	having	left,	can	be	made	to	accept	a	new	European
relationship.	Today	it	matters	to	her	little	whether	that	is	tantamount	to	EEA	membership,	or	a	radical	separation.
Indeed,	best	not	to	say.
Who’s	in	charge?
It’s	not	much	of	a	dream,	and	in	any	event	the	Prime	Minister	is	not	mistress	of	her	own	destiny.	Others	have	a	say	in
the	matter:	the	Conservative	party,	Parliament	and	the	EU.
The	EU	matters	most.	So	far	the	negotiations	have	consisted	largely	of	eventual	UK	agreement	to	the	terms
proposed	by	Michel	Barnier.	Hardly	surprising,	as	the	UK	holds	no	cards.	Two	obstacles,	however,	stand	in	the	way
of	the	EU’s	agreeing	to	May’s	dream.	The	first	is	exasperation:	nearly	two	years	after	the	referendum,	Britain	still
doesn’t	have	a	clue	what	it	wants,	so	why	put	up	with	more	years	of	vacillation?	Other	fish	need	frying.
The	second	is	Ireland.	The	UK	made	promises	about	the	Irish	border,	which	Brussels	wants	London	to	keep	in
practice	and	enshrine	in	the	withdrawal	agreement.	Hard	to	do	in	the	absence	of	any	clear	understanding	of	the	UK-
EU	relationship.
May’s	Cabinet	and	party	are	increasingly	pressing	for	greater	clarity	too.	To	general	astonishment,	she’s	announced
a	White	Paper	before	the	next	European	summit	setting	out	what	Britain	wants	–	two	years	after	the	referendum	and
one	after	lighting	the	blue	touchpaper	of	Article	50.	But	the	options	presented	for	the	critical	issue	of	customs	will
remain	an	evasion	of	the	real	issue.	So-called	“max-fac”	is	merely	a	cosmetic	for	a	hard	border,	while	the	ingenious
“customs	partnership”	plan	would	be	undeliverable	in	any	reasonable	timeframe	–	even	if	the	EU	had	not	already
rejected	it	out	of	hand	because	of	the	burdens	it	would	place	on	them.
The	pressure	from	Parliament,	notably	the	House	of	Lords,	is	essentially	for	Brexit	damage	limitation:	a	customs
union,	and	quite	possibly	single	market	membership	too,	for	the	long	run.
The	limits	of	prophecy
	With	so	weak	a	government,	and	so	many	conflicting	pressures,	multiple	outcomes	are	possible.	It	is	still	(just)
conceivable	that	pro-European	campaigners	could	secure	another	referendum	and	win	it,	but	this	is	increasingly
unlikely.	Public	opinion	has	not	changed	dramatically	enough,	and	the	parliamentary	arithmetic	is	against	them.	No
game-changing	offer	will	come	from	Europe.	It	is	certainly	possible	that	the	UK’s	incoherent	and	contradictory
demands	will	cause	negotiations	to	collapse,	and	the	UK’s	exit	will	be	chaotic	and	hard.	It’s	even	possible	that	a	deal
on	Barnier’s	terms	will	be	agreed	in	September.	But	it’s	not	wholly	unreasonable	to	expect	that	a	variant	of	May’s
dream	will	happen.	Here	is	how,	what	to	look	out	for	along	the	way,	and	whom	it	will	disappoint.
First	of	all,	the	government’s	White	Paper	will	prove	to	be	a	long	and	detailed	version	of	having	our	cake	and	eating
it.
The	UK	negotiating	position,	on	the	face	of	it,	will	be	to	reject	the	customs	union	and	the	single	market	in	the	long
run.	The	customs	partnership	option	will	be	upfront,	but	the	long-term	trading	arrangements	will	once	again	be
described	as	bespoke	and	needing	detailed	consideration.	Few	details	will	be	provided.	Nor	will	it	solve	the	Irish
problem,	though	we	now	have	learnt	that	it	will	promise	to	remain	in	a	customs	union	until	we	do.
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Then,	Parliament	will	overrule	the	government.	In	motions	and	likely	in	legislation	it	will	mandate	negotiating	a
customs	union	and	possibly	a	relationship	with	the	single	market.	But	to	secure	a	Commons	majority,	these	will	allow
the	government	some	wiggle	room.	This	will	play	into	the	negotiations	with	the	EU,	and	make	it	easier	for	Brussels	to
accept	less	detailed	statements	about	future	trade	and	regulatory	alignment,	postponing	the	hard	negotiations	into
the	transition	period.	That	transition	period	will	be	made	implicitly	or	explicitly	extendable,	perhaps	on	the	condition
that	negotiations	are	proceeding	in	good	faith.	Its	21-month	length	was	designed	to	match	the	EU	budget	cycle	–	a
pretty	clear	signal	that	further	budgetary	concessions	will	buy	continued	‘transitional’	access	to	the	customs	union
and	single	market.
The	EU	will	however	demand	further	and	better	assurances	on	the	Irish	question,	more	detailed	and	explicit	than	so
far,	and	dealing	with	regulation	as	well	as	customs.	May	will	give	them.	She	has	already	moved	on	customs.	We	saw
in	the	earlier	negotiations	that	Brussels	will	not	abandon	Dublin,	but	nor	in	the	end	will	it	allow	the	Irish	government	to
veto	a	deal	like	this.
Consequences
Two	sets	of	consequences	follow,	one	about	Europe	and	one	for	British	politics.	The	EU	will	only	enter	the	post
Brexit	negotiations	on	the	pragmatic	basis	that	continued	temporary	or	permanent	membership	of	a	customs	union
and	the	single	market	is	a	highly	likely	outcome.	It	might	be	that	over	time	what	is	effectively	continued	economic	but
not	political	union	is	broadly	acceptable	to	British	public	opinion.	That	in	part	depends	on	the	reaction	of	Brexiteers	in
the	Conservative	party.	Some,	of	course,	will	utterly	reject	any	continuing	Brussels	rules	or	payments,	and	resent	EU
migration.	Others,	more	dangerously,	may	blame	Ireland,	and	seek	to	undermine	the	Good	Friday	Agreement.
Others,	having	looked	over	the	cliff	of	a	chaotic	exit,	might	make	their	peace	with	this	uncomfortable	halfway	house.
Any	government	led	by	May	or	someone	like	her	will	keep	pushing	the	problem	as	far	as	possible	into	the	future,	in
the	hope	that	the	steam	goes	out	of	it.
The	more	unsettling	effect	may	be	on	the	nature	of	UK	political	debate.	Here	the	lessons	of	the	Scottish	referendum
are	interesting.	Insurgent	nationalists	are	disinclined	to	take	No	for	an	answer,	and	the	constitutional	question	has
continued	to	dominate	Scottish	politics	since	the	No	vote	of	2014,	at	the	expense	of	domestic	issues.	In	the	scenario
painted	here,	the	largest	risk	is	that	anti-European	activists,	England’s	nationalists,	behave	in	the	same	way.	The
story	of	betrayal	is	already	being	constructed.	It	is	a	dispiriting	prophecy	that	foretells	we	will	still	be	arguing	about
our	relationship	with	Europe,	and	only	that,	in	four	years’	time.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Jim	Gallagher	is	Visiting	Professor	of	Government	at	Glasgow	University	and	an	Associate	Member	at	Nuffield
College,	Oxford.	
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